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Quattrocki and Friston (2014) argued that abnormalities in interoception—the process of representing
one’s internal physiological states—could lie at the heart of autism, because of the critical role
interoception plays in the ontogeny of social-affective processes. This proposal drew criticism from
proponents of the alexithymia hypothesis, who argue that social-affective and underlying interoceptive
impairments are not a feature of autism per se, but of alexithymia (a condition characterized by
difficulties describing and identifying one’s own emotions), which commonly co-occurs with autism.
Despite the importance of this debate for our understanding of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and of
the role of interoceptive impairments in psychopathology, more generally, direct empirical evidence is
scarce and inconsistent. Experiment 1 examined in a sample of 137 neurotypical (NT) individuals the
association among autistic traits, alexithymia, and interoceptive accuracy (IA) on a standard heartbeat-
tracking measure of IA. In Experiment 2, IA was assessed in 46 adults with ASD (27 of whom had
clinically significant alexithymia) and 48 NT adults. Experiment 1 confirmed strong associations between
autistic traits and alexithymia, but yielded no evidence to suggest that either was associated with
interoceptive difficulties. Similarly, Experiment 2 provided no evidence for interoceptive impairments in
autistic adults, irrespective of any co-occurring alexithymia. Bayesian analyses consistently supported the
null hypothesis. The observations pose a significant challenge to notions that interoceptive impairments
constitute a core feature of either ASD or alexithymia, at least as far as the direct perception of
interoceptive signals is concerned.
General Scientific Summary
This article suggests that impairments in interoception—the process of representing one’s internal
physiological states—do not lie at the heart of either autism or alexithymia.
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Interoception refers to the representation of one’s internal phys-
iological states, such as breathing, hunger, thirst, and heart rate
(Craig, 2003). Recently, studies have linked interoceptive accuracy
(IA; i.e., the extent to which one can detect interoceptive signals
accurately) to a number of important psychological functions, such
as emotion processing (Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aron-
son, 2004; Shah, Catmur, & Bird, 2016; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner,
2012), empathy (Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011), theory
of mind (Demers & Koven, 2015; Shah, Catmur, & Bird, 2017),
and self-awareness (Seth, 2013). These associations support theo-
ries that suggest cognition is “embodied” (Gallese & Sinigaglia,
2011; Glenberg, 2010; Goldman & de Vignemont, 2009), and
imply that interoception impairments might play a critical role in
psychological disorders. Indeed, impairments in interoception
have been implicated recently in increasingly prominent theories
of one developmental disorder, in particular: namely, autism spec-
trum disorder (ASD; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014).
ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder diagnosed on the basis of
behavioral impairments in social-communication and behavioral
flexibility (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). At the
cognitive level, difficulties with theory of mind (Yirmiya, Erel,
Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998), emotion processing (Gaigg,
2012), and psychological aspects of self-awareness (Williams,
2010) are well-established among people with ASD. Moreover,
approximately 50% of autistic individuals have clinically signifi-
cant levels of alexithymia (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz, &
Frith, 2004; Joukamaa et al., 2007; Milosavljevic et al., 2016)—a
condition characterized by difficulties with representing, under-
standing, and describing one’s own emotional states (Taylor,
1984). This collection of impairments led Quattrocki and Friston
(2014) to suggest that impairments in interoception, due to a
dysfunctional oxytocin system, may be the root cause of autism.
Oxytocin is a hormone and neurotransmitter that plays a signifi-
cant role in regulating social-affiliative behaviors. Quattrocki and
Friston (2014) argue that a dysfunctional oxytocin system could
lead to abnormalities in the production and modulation of intero-
ceptive signals, and their integration with exteroceptive informa-
tion about the environment. As a result, autistic children develop
impoverished internal models of emotional states (i.e., alexithy-
mia) and the self, more generally, while external social-emotional
signals hold less salience and therefore lead to the specifically
characteristic social-affective impairments of the disorder. A cru-
cial prediction that follows from this view is that IA should be
associated with the number of ASD traits manifested by a person
and also be reliably impaired among people with a diagnosis of
ASD (Hypothesis 1).
In contrast, others have argued that self-awareness difficulties in
ASD should be restricted to awareness of one’s own cognitive and
emotional states (i.e., the psychological self), leaving basic detec-
tion of one’s own physiological states (i.e., the physical self)
essentially unimpaired (Lind, 2010; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010).
This view is derived from observations of a preserved sense of
agency (Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, Heacock, & Cosby, 2012;
Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott, 2012; Schauder, Mash, Bryant, &
Cascio, 2015) and preserved self-recognition (Dawson & McKiss-
ick, 1984; Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Lind & Bowler, 2009) in
ASD. This account, therefore, leads to the prediction that IA
should not be associated with ASD traits or impaired in people
with a full diagnosis of ASD (Hypothesis 2).
Distinct from the two views above is the more recent idea that
many of the social-affective difficulties experienced by people
with ASD are, in fact, the result of co-occurring alexithymia,
rather than the result of ASD itself (Bird & Cook, 2013; Bird et
al., 2010; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Oakley, Brewer,
Bird, & Catmur, 2016). According to this alexithymia hypoth-
esis, difficulties with emotion processing and empathy are only
apparent in people with ASD who also have high levels of
alexithymia (or comorbid alexithymia). Most important, unlike
Quattrocki and Friston (2014) who view interoceptive abnor-
malities as central to the etiology of ASD, the alexithymia
hypothesis considers interoceptive abnormalities central to the
etiology of alexithymia (Brewer, Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2015;
Hatfield, Brown, Giummarra, & Lenggenhager, 2017; Herbert,
Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016).
This leads to the prediction that IA should be associated with
the level of alexithymia, rather than the number of ASD traits,
manifested by a person and that it should be significantly
impaired only among people with ASD who manifest clinically
significant levels of alexithymia (Hypothesis 3).
Although distinguishing the three competing predictions above
is of central importance to our understanding of the defining
features of ASD, only four studies have assessed IA in this
population and the results are highly inconclusive. In line with H1,
Garfinkel and colleagues (Garfinkel, Tiley, et al., 2016) found
reduced accuracy among 20 adults with ASD on a classic
heartbeat-tracking task that required participants to keep count of
their heartbeats without physically taking their own pulse. Like-
wise, Palser, Fotopoulou, Pellicano, and Kilner (2018) found re-
duced IA on the heartbeat-tracking task in 30 autistic children. In
contrast, Schauder et al. (2015) observed no impairments on the
same heartbeat-tracking task in a group of 21 autistic children. In
keeping with H2, this study furthermore found that heartbeat
tracking accuracy was correlated with a test of bodily awareness
on which children with autism were also unimpaired, thus con-
firming a putative link between preserved interoception and a
preserved awareness of the physical self in ASD. Finally, Gaigg,
Cornell, and Bird (2016), using a physiological arousal tracking
paradigm, and Shah, Catmur, et al. (2016), using the traditional
heartbeat-tracking task, obtained partial evidence for H3 by show-
ing that IA was unimpaired in adults with ASD who were matched
to a comparison group on self-reported levels of alexithymia. This
group matching ensured that levels of alexithymia were experi-
mentally controlled when examining IA, leading the authors to
suggest that interoceptive impairments would have been observed
in ASD if groups had not been matched on alexithymia and that
differences in findings across other studies (e.g., Garfinkel, Tiley,
et al., 2016; Schauder et al., 2015) likely reflect differences across
ASD samples in the prevalence of alexithymia.
The evidence concerning interoception in ASD is not only
difficult to interpret because of the inconsistencies across studies,
but also because three of the five studies essentially argue for the
null hypothesis (i.e., no difference between ASD and comparison
groups) on the basis of very small samples. Moreover, in the
studies of Gaigg et al. (2016) and Shah, Catmur, et al. (2016), the
group-matching strategy meant that the majority of individuals
scored in the subclinical range for alexithymia, rendering the ASD
groups nonrepresentative of the wider autism spectrum where an
estimated 50% of individuals manifest alexithymia (Berthoz &
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Hill, 2005). In other words, the central claim of the alexithymia
hypothesis—that interoceptive impairments would be observed in
individuals with ASD who have clinically significant levels of
alexithymia—remains untested. To test this prediction and contrast
it effectively with the alternative predictions outlined above, it is
necessary to compare IA among individuals with ASD who report
clinically significant alexithymia (ASD-high alexithymia) with IA
among matched individuals with ASD who report subclinical
levels of alexithymia (ASD-low alexithymia). If H1 is correct,
regardless of alexithymia level, individuals with ASD should show
impaired interoception relative to an NT comparison group. In
contrast, if H2 is correct, individuals with ASD should show
unimpaired interoception, regardless of alexithymia level. Finally,
if H3 is correct, then only ASD-high alexithymia individuals
should manifest diminished IA, with the ASD-low alexithymia
individuals demonstrating equivalent IA to the neurotypical (NT)
group. In Experiment 2, we tested these predictions among 46
individuals with ASD and 48 NT participants. First, however,
Experiment 1 examined the associations predicted by H1 and H3
among IA, alexithymia, ASD traits, and theory of mind in 137 NT
individuals.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty-seven students (114 female)
from the University of Kent took part in Experiment 1. The
average age of participants was 19.73 years (SD  2.98; range 
18–23 years). No participant had a history of ASD, according to
self-report. All participants gave informed consent and received
course credit in partial fulfilment of their degree, for taking part in
the study. The experiment was approved by the School of Psy-
chology Research Ethics Committee, University of Kent (Ethics
ID: 201714870662234338).
Materials and procedures. Interoception was measured us-
ing a standard heartbeat-tracking task (Schandry, 1981). In a quiet
room, participants were asked to close their eyes and, without
taking their pulse, silently count their heartbeat during four differ-
ent time intervals (25, 35, 45, and 100 s), which were presented in
a randomized order. An auditory tone signaled the beginning and
end of each time interval. A pulse oximeter (Contec Systems
CMS-50D; Qinhuangdao, China) attached to participants’ index
finger measured their actual heart rate. IA was calculated as 1 –
(recorded number of heartbeats  counted number of heartbeats)/
[(recorded heartbeats  counted number of heartbeats)/2] by Gar-
finkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, and Critchley (2015). This provided
a value between 1 and 1 for each time interval, with more
positive values indicating better IA.1 It should be noted that the
heartbeat-tracking task has come under recent scrutiny, with some
claiming that the task is not always/necessarily a valid measure of
interoception (see Brener & Ring, 2016, for a review). We con-
sider this concern further in the Discussion section, below. Here,
we note only that the heartbeat-tracking task is (for better or
worse) by far the most widely used measure of interoception in the
literature, in part because of ease of administration and in part
because monitoring one’s own heartbeat is fundamental to emo-
tional experience. The task has good test–retest reliability (Muss-
gay, Klinkenberg, & Rüddel, 1999), is sensitive to individual
differences (Christensen, Gaigg, & Calvo-Merino, 2018; Dunn et
al., 2010; Garfinkel et al., 2015) and is mediated by brain regions
that are involved in awareness of one’s physiological states
(Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Pollatos,
Schandry, Auer, & Kaufmann, 2007). Nevertheless, to address
some of the concerns that exist in relation to this task, we also
present some additional analyses in Supplement 1 (see Point 4 of
the online supplemental materials, in particular).
The 50-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) was administered
as a self-report measure of autistic traits, and the 20-item Toronto
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) as a
self-report measure of alexithymia. Each questionnaire requires
participants to indicate to what extent a series of statements applies
to them (e.g., AQ: “I find social situations easy”; TAS-20: “I have
feelings that I can’t quite identify”), with scores on the AQ ranging
from 0–50 (scores 26 are suggestive of a possible diagnosis of
autism) and scores on the TAS-20 ranging from 20–100
(scores 60 indicate clinically significant alexithymia). In addi-
tion, participants completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
(RMIE) task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb,
2001). This widely recognized measure of emotional theory of
mind requires participants to decide which of four mental state
terms (mostly emotional in nature) best describes the feelings
conveyed by the eye region of faces as portrayed in 36 unique
photographs. Scores range from 0–36, with higher scores indicat-
ing better emotional theory of mind. We included the RMIE task
specifically because it differentiates groups of ASD participants
from groups of NT participants and because it taps those emotional
aspects of theory of mind that are thought to be related to alex-
ithymia (Oakley et al., 2016). Given that recent studies have shown
an association between IA and emotional, but not nonemotional,
aspects of mind reading (Shah et al., 2017), we included the RMIE
to investigate the relation between emotional theory of mind and
interoception.
Statistical power and analysis. An a priori power calculation
using GPower3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) re-
vealed that, to detect an association between IA and TAS score of
r  .37 (as found by Herbert et al., 2011, and Shah, Catmur, et
al., 2016) on 80% of occasions using two-tailed tests, 55 partici-
pants are required. A larger sample was recruited here to allow for
the cross-validation of the findings, by randomly splitting the total
sample into two subsamples (n  68 and 69, respectively), each
1 Shah and colleagues (2016) used a slightly different calculation to
measure interoceptive accuracy (IA) on the heartbeat detection task: [1 –
(recorded number of heartbeats – counted number of heartbeats/recorded
heartbeats)]  100. This calculation, which produces significantly higher
mean levels of IA to the calculation employed by Garfinkel, Tiley, et al.
(2015), has the limitation of being open to potential positive accuracy
biases in IA when participants display high variance in their responses,
especially in cases where participants overestimate the number of heart-
beats in a given time interval. However, for completeness we also analyzed
data from Experiments 1 and 2 using the Shah calculation. Results were
substantively identical using both methods. The correlation between IA
calculated using the Shandry equation and IA calculated using the Garfin-
kel equation is almost perfect in our Experiments 1 and 2 (rs  .98, ps 
.001). All significant findings using the Garfinkel, Tiley, et al. (2016)
scoring were significant using the Shah et al. scoring, and all nonsignificant
findings using the Garfinkel et al. scoring were nonsignificant using the
Shah et al. scoring.
614 NICHOLSON ET AL.
with sufficient power (.90) to detect a reliable association be-
tween TAS-20 score and IA. Bayesian analyses were also con-
ducted (using JASP 0.8.1; JASP Team, 2016) to provide a more
graded interpretation of the data than is possible using p values or
effect sizes alone (e.g., Dienes, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). Bayes factors (BF10) 3 provide firm
evidence for the alternative hypothesis (with values 10, 30,
and 100 providing strong/very strong/decisive evidence) and
values under 1 provide evidence for the null (with values 0.33
providing firm evidence; Jeffreys, 1961).
Results
Among the entire sample, the 137 participants scored a mean
of 25.82 (SD  3.97) on the RMIE task, 16.99 (SD  6.66) on
the AQ, and 50.82 (SD  10.29) on the TAS. The mean IA
score on the heartbeat detection task was .50 (SD  .27).
Crucially, there was no significant association between IA and
TAS total score, r  .008, p  .92, BF10  0.11, or between IA
and any of the other variables: (AQ total score: r  .11, p 
.22, BF10  0.22; RMIE: r  .03, p  .73, BF10  0.11). TAS
total score was, however, associated significantly with both AQ
total score, r  .42, p  .001, BF10  100, and RMIE,
r  .24, p  .005, BF10  5.16, whereas AQ total score and
RMIE were not significantly associated in the current sample,
r  .11, p  .21, BF10  0.24 (and note that the association
between TAS and RMIE remained significant after controlling
for AQ, rp  .21, p  .01).2 Finally, Fisher’s Z tests revealed
that the IA  TAS correlation was significantly different from
that reported by Herbert et al. (2011), Z  3.35, p  .001, and
Shah, Catmur, et al. (2016), Z  2.03, p  .04. For ease of
reference, this pattern of correlations is set out in Table 1 along
with those for Experiment 2.
Although IA and TAS were not significantly associated, it may
be that IA would nonetheless be significantly impaired among
individuals with significant levels of alexithymia. To investigate
this, the current sample was divided according to scores on the
TAS. Those with scores above the cutoff were assigned to a “high
alexithymia” group (n  30) and those with scores below the
cutoff to a “low alexithymia” group (n  107). The average IA
score was .49 (SD  .28) among the low alexithymia group and
.55 (SD .26) among the high alexithymia group, a difference that
was small and statistically nonsignificant, t(135)  1.04, p  .30,
d  0.22, BF10  0.35. The mean IA score for each time interval
on the heartbeat detection task among each alexithymia group is
presented in Table 2. A 2 (group: high alexithymia/low alexithy-
mia)  4 (time interval: 25 s/35 s/45 s/100 s) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was conducted on this data. Results revealed nonsig-
nificant main effects of time interval, F(3, 405)  1.13, p  .34,
p2  .008, and group, F(1, 135)  1.08, p  .30, p2  .008.
Moreover, the Group  Time Interval interaction effect was also
nonsignificant, F(3, 405)  1.65, p  .18, p2  .01. Thus, there
were no significant differences between the high and low alexithy-
mia groups in terms of either overall level or patterns of IA on the
heartbeat-tracking task.
Cross-validation of results. We assessed the reliability of
the current findings by randomly splitting our sample into two
groups of n  68 and 69 participants, respectively, and reana-
lyzing the data in each subsample. The results are presented in
full in Supplement 1. In summary, results were identical in each
subsample and replicated the results observed in the full sample
of 137.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Forty-six adults with ASD and 48 NT compar-
ison adults aged between 20 and 64 years were recruited and tested
either at City, University of London, or the University of Kent.
Verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ (VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ,
respectively) scores were gained for all participants using either
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence-II (Wechsler,
1999; n  38), or the Wechsler Adult Scales of Intelligence
(Wechsler, 2008; n  56). Participants in the ASD group had
received verified diagnoses, according to conventional criteria
(APA, 2000; World Health Organization, 1993). In addition, par-
ticipants with ASD completed the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), a detailed observational
assessment of ASD features. Participant groups were closely
matched for age, sex, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ, but differed signifi-
cantly in AQ, TAS, and RMIE scores (Table 3). All participants in
the ASD group scored above the ASD cutoff score of 7 on the
ADOS and/or 26 on the AQ. Ten of the 46 participants with ASD
scored above the ASD cutoff on the AQ only (with ADOS scores
of 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 4, 3, 3, respectively). Importantly, none of the
results reported in Experiment 2 changed substantively when these
10 participants with ASD were excluded from analyses (see the
online supplemental materials).
Materials and procedures. Participants from each group
completed a version of the heartbeat-tracking task used in Exper-
iment 1. Thirty-eight (17 ASD, 21 NT) completed the heartbeat-
tracking task at Location 1 (University of Kent), using identical
materials and procedures as in Experiment 1. The remaining 56
participants completed the heartbeat-tracking task at Location 2
(City, University of London), using almost identical materials and
procedures as in Experiment 1. The only difference was that, rather
than sitting with their eyes closed and an auditory tone signaling
the start and stop of each interval, participants saw a start/stop
signal on a screen (a heart appeared along with the word “Go” at
the start, then the heart disappeared at the end and was replaced by
“Stop”) followed by a screen that asked participants to enter their
count using the keyboard. In addition, the hardware used to record
heartbeats was different and consisted of an ADInstruments Pow-
2 To confirm that there were no systematic differences between males
and females in terms of interoceptive accuracy (IA) on the heartbeat
detection task, a 2 (sex: male/female) 4 (time interval: 25 s/35 s/45 s/100
s) interaction was conducted on this data. Results revealed a nonsignificant
main effect of group, F(1, 135)  0.22, p  .64, p2  .002, as well as a
nonsignificant Sex  Time Interval interaction, F(3, 405)  0.63, p  .60,
p2  .005. Thus, there were no significant differences between males and
females in terms of either overall level of IA or patterns of accuracy across
time intervals. Likewise, when correlation analyses were conducted among
males and females separately, exactly the same pattern held in both sexes:
IA was nonsignificantly associated with any other variables in either sex,
all rs  .13, all ps  .25. Likewise, AQ and RMIE were nonsignificantly
associated among both males and females, all rs  .15, all ps  .22. TAS
total score was associated with both AQ total score and RMIE total among
both males and females, all rs  .19, all ps  .04.
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erLab unit (ML845) with a bioelectrical signal amplifier (ML408)
that recorded the ECG signal through three shielded snap-connect
electrodes placed on the participants chest and elbow (the refer-
ence electrode). LabChart 7 (ADInstruments, 1994–2004) soft-
ware was used to record the raw ECG signal at 1 kHz and the data
were processed offline to extract the heartbeat frequencies. A
“Stop” and “Go” signal was superimposed on the ECG trace
through a hardware link with the stimulus presentation computer.
Importantly, there were no systematic differences in results across
the two locations.
Statistical power and analysis. Given ambiguities in the meth-
ods and results of previous studies, we based our sample size on that
required to detect a small-to-moderate overall group difference in IA,
given that it is arguable that any effect smaller than this is unlikely to
be clinically significant (even if it is statistically significant). A sample
of 94 participants provides sufficient power to detect a between-
groups difference of 0.50 if it exists. Crucially, Bayesian analyses
were used to supplement null hypothesis significance testing.
Results
The average IA score was .57 (SD .27) among the ASD group
and .61 (SD  .32) among the NT group, a difference that was
statistically small and nonsignificant, t(92)  0.63, p  .53, d 
0.13, BF10 0.26. The mean IA score for each time interval on the
heartbeat detection task in each diagnostic group is shown in
Figure 1. A 2 (group: ASD/NT)  4 (time interval: 25s/35s/45s/
100s) ANOVA was conducted on this data. Neither the main effect
of group, F(1, 92)  0.39, p  .53, p2  .004, nor the Group 
Time Interval interaction effect, F(3, 405)  1.65, p  .18, p2 
.01, was significant. Thus, there were no significant differences
between the ASD and comparison groups in terms of either overall
level of IA or patterns of IA across the four time intervals.
Out of 46 participants with ASD, 27 (58.7%) scored over the
TAS cutoff for alexithymia, compared with only three of 48
(6.3%) of NT participants, 	2  29.73, p  .001, 
  .56, which
is comparable to the prevalence estimates of clinically significant
alexithymia in ASD as estimated in the sample of (e.g., Hill et al.,
2004). Although the analyses above indicated that the ASD group
as a whole did not manifest a deficit in interoception, it is possible
that (in accordance with the alexithymia hypothesis) IA would be
diminished among those participants with ASD who self-report
clinically significant levels of alexithymia on the TAS. In order to
investigate this, the ASD sample was divided according to TAS
score. Those with scores above the cutoff were assigned to a high
alexithymia ASD group and those with scores below the cutoff to
a low alexithymia ASD group. These subsamples were matched in
terms of age, VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, sex, ADOS total score, and RMIE
total score, all ps  .40, all ds  0.27.
Table 1
Correlations Between Interoceptive Accuracy (IA), Alexithymia (TAS-20), Autistic Traits (AQ),
and Theory of Mind (RMIE) for Experiment 1 and the ASD and NT Participant Groups in
Experiment 2
Exp. 1 (n  137) Exp. 2 ASD (n  46) Exp. 2 TD (n  48)
Measure IA TAS-20 AQ IA TAS-20 AQ IA TAS-20 AQ
TAS-20 .008 .08 .21
AQ .011 .42 .03 .61 .21 .42
RMIE .03 .24 .11 .34 .10 .13 .09 .29 .20
Note. Pearson’s R coefficients are shown, with significant associations highlighted with asterisks. IA 
interoceptive accuracy; TAS-20  Toronto Alexithymia Scale; AQ  Autism-Spectrum Quotient; RMIE 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes task; ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
 p  .05.  p  .01.
Table 2
Interoceptive Accuracy in Experiments 1 as a Function of the Interval Duration Over Which
Participants Tracked Their Heartbeat. Descriptive Statistics are Shown for Overall Group
Means as Well as High and Low Alexithymia Subgroups Where Relevant
Group
25 s 35 s 45 s 100 s Overall
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Experiment 1
High alex (n  30) .55 .32 .54 .32 .58 .25 .52 .27 .55 .26
Low alex (n  107) .47 .32 .54 .32 .47 .31 .48 .33 .49 .28
Overall (n  137) .49 .32 .54 .31 .5 .3 .49 .32 .50 .27
Experiment 2
NT (n  48) .61 .36 .62 .33 .58 .32 .61 .32 .61 .32
ASD (n  46) .61 .25 .58 .32 .56 .30 .52 .34 .57 .27
High alex ASD (n  27) .63 .29 .64 .34 .61 .32 .57 .34 .61 .29
Low alex ASD (n  19) .58 .19 .51 .27 .50 .27 .45 .34 .51 .24
Note. alex  alexithymia; NT  neurotypical; ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
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The average IA score on the heartbeat detection task was .51
(SD  .24) among the low alexithymia subsample and .61 (SD 
.29) among the high alexithymia subsample, a difference that was
small and statistically nonsignificant, t  1.30, p  .20, d  0.39,
BF10  0.58. The mean IA score for each time interval on the
heartbeat detection task among each subsample of ASD partici-
pants is shown in Figure 1. A 2 (subsample: high alexithymia/low
alexithymia) 4 (time interval: 25 s/35 s/45 s/100 s) ANOVA was
conducted on this data. Neither the main effect of subsample, F(1,
44) 1.69, p .20, p2  .04, nor the Subsample Time Interval
interaction effect, F(3, 132)  0.57, p  .64, p2  .01, was
significant. Thus, there were no significant differences between the
high and low alexithymia subsamples of ASD participants in terms
of either overall level or patterns of IA.
In terms of associations, IA was nonsignificantly associated
with TAS total score among both participants with ASD, r  .08,
p  .59, BF10  0.21, and NT participants, r  .21, p  .16,
BF10  0.47. Likewise, IA was nonsignificantly associated with
AQ total score among both participants with ASD, r  .03, p 
.83, BF10  0.19, and NT participants, r  .21, p  .16, BF10 
0.47. Fisher’s Z tests revealed that the IA  TAS total score
correlation was significantly smaller in magnitude than those re-
ported by Herbert et al. (2011) and Shah, Hall, et al. (2016) among
both participants with ASD (all Zs  2.00, all ps  .04) and NT
participants (all Zs  2.00, all ps  .001).3
General Discussion
The current findings appear to provide a significant challenge to
recent theories of the mechanisms underlying the ASD phenotype
in general, as well to theories of self-awareness in this disorder. In
terms of theories of the phenotype, within a predictive coding
framework, it has been suggested that interoceptive inference
might be impaired in ASD due to a developmental pathophysiol-
ogy related to oxytocin (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). Yet, in our
experiments, we found no evidence that interoception was associ-
ated with autistic traits or that it was impaired in adults with ASD,
despite the fact that the ASD adults in Experiment 2 displayed the
characteristic impairments in attributing mental/emotional states
to others (on the RMIE task) that are argued to be one of
the consequences of interoceptive impairments (see Table 3).
The significant between-groups difference in performance on the
RMIE task was large and associated with a Bayes factor that
strongly suggested the ASD group had a mind reading impairment.
In contrast, the group difference in accuracy on the heartbeat-
tracking task was nonsignificant, and associated with only a neg-
ligible effect size and a Bayes factor that supported the null
hypothesis. Moreover, there was no significant association be-
tween RMIE and IA in any of the samples we tested in either
experiment, which again counterindicates the claim of predictive
coding theories that interoception contributes significantly to
social-cognitive abilities (in addition to underpinning the behav-
ioral impairments diagnostic of ASD).
One point to note here is that we did not collect any index of
participants’ body mass index (BMI), or levels of mental health
difficulties. High BMI values can result in attenuated IA (e.g.,
Herbert et al., 2011), as can high levels of depression and anxiety
(Garfinkel, Tiley, et al., 2016; but see Palser et al., 2018). The
literature on BMI in adults with ASD is not entirely consistent, but
shows a clear trend for adults with this condition to be overweight/
obese, on average (Eaves & Ho, 2008; Jones et al., 2016; Ogden,
Carroll, Kit, & Flegal, 2014; Tyler, Schramm, Karafa, Tang, &
Jain, 2011). If our sample was representative, we might assume
that there was a greater proportion of overweight individuals with
ASD than overweight NT individuals. In that case, the participants
with ASD would have been at a disadvantage on the heartbeat
3 To confirm that there were no systematic differences in results across
locations, an extra location variable was included in a second ANOVA.
Hence, a 2 (location: Kent/City)  2 (group: ASD/NT)  4 (time interval:
25 s/35 s/45 s/100 s) interaction was conducted on interoceptive accuracy
(IA) data. Main effects and interactions involving group and time interval
were the same as in the original ANOVA and, most important, none of the
main effects (all ps  .18, all p2  .02) or interaction effects (all ps  .28,
all p2  .02) involving location were significant or greater than small in
magnitude. Mean IA among participants at Kent was .66 (SD  .22) and
was .69 (SD  .17) among participants at City, a difference that is small
and nonsignificant, t 0.83, p .41, d 0.15. Likewise, when correlation
analyses were conducted among participants from each location separately,
exactly the same pattern held in both: IA was nonsignificantly associated
with any other variables in either Location 1 or Location 2, all rs  .12, all
ps  .47. TAS total score was associated significantly with AQ total score
at both locations, all rs  .68, all ps  .001.
Table 3
Experiment 2 Participant Characteristics and Matching Statistics
Measure ASD (n  46) Comparison (n  48) t p d BF10
Age 40.16 (11.72) 41.19 (12.57) .41 .68 .09 .23
VIQ 109.98 (16.94) 111.17 (13.51) .38 .71 .08 .23
PIQ 105.52 (17.46) 105.90 (12.67) .11 .91 .03 .22
FSIQ 108.17 (16.91) 109.10 (12.18) .31 .76 .06 .23
TAS 59.33 (14.17) 44.88 (9.79) 5.77 .001 1.19 100
AQa 32.56 (7.79) 16.91 (5.64) 10.99 .001 2.31 100
ADOSb 9.40 (4.16)
RMIEc 23.33 (6.17) 26.87 (3.75) 3.28 .001 .70 21.35
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; BF10  Bayes factor; VIQ  verbal IQ; PIQ  performance IQ;
FSIQ  full-scale IQ; TAS  Toronto Alexithymia Scale; AQ  Autism-Spectrum Quotient; ADOS  Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule; RMIE  Reading the Mind in the Eyes task.
a AQ data is missing for one ASD and one comparison participant. b ADOS was completed by 40/46
participants with ASD (6 participants refused to complete the task or were unable to complete it during the
study). c RMIE was completed by 42/46 participants with ASD and 46/48 neurotypical participants.
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detection task. Likewise, rates of depression and anxiety are sig-
nificantly higher among people with ASD (44%; Simonoff et al.,
2008) than among people in the general population (9%;
McManus, Bebbington, Jenkins, & Brugha, 2016), so participants
with ASD might have been at a disadvantage on the heartbeat-
tracking task. It seems highly unlikely that both the ASD and
control samples were so unrepresentative that rates of depression
and anxiety were greater in control participants than in ASD
participants. If this was the case (and if controls had elevated rates
of undiagnosed depression and anxiety), then several other results
should have been apparent, but they were not. For example, there
is evidence that mind reading, particularly for emotional states like
those involved in the RMIE task, is diminished in people with
depression/anxiety (e.g., Bourke, Douglas, & Porter, 2010; Fergu-
son & Cane, 2017; Wang, Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008;
Wolkenstein, Schönenberg, Schirm, & Hautzinger, 2011). Like-
wise, depressive symptoms are associated with elevated rates of
alexithymia (e.g., Herbert et al., 2011; Lyvers, Kohlsdorf, Ed-
wards, & Thorberg, 2017). If the controls in our Experiment 2 had
unusually high rates of mood disorder and if this explained the
failure to find group differences in IA, then we should also have
failed to observe between-groups differences in performance on
the RMIE task (cf., Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, & Jacobson, 2005) or
TAS. Yet, we observed significant (and large) between-groups
differences in each of these measures, as predicted and would be
expected on the basis of the extensive literature on these abilities
in ASD. These findings provide reassurance that we have not
committed a Type II error in concluding that IA is undiminished in
ASD. Moreover, the sample size in our Experiment 2 (n 94) was
nearly 2.5 times that of the sample size in any other study of IA in
ASD. Thus, confidence in the reliability of the current findings
should be relatively high. In the context of an interoceptive infer-
ence account of ASD, our findings would suggest that any poten-
tial dysregulation of the interoceptive system lies not at the level of
perception, but rather interpretation and integration, and is unlikely
to be specific to interoception alone.
Of course, the current results should be interpreted within the
context of the heartbeat-tracking task we employed as the measure
of interoception. It is possible that different results would be
observed with a different measure of interoception, such as report-
ing changes in heart rate following administration of a beta-
adrenergic agonist, which raises heart rate and blood pressure,
allowing easier detection of heartbeats (Khalsa, Rudrauf, Sand-
esara, Olshansky, & Tranel, 2009), or reporting of respiratory or
gastric interoception (Garfinkel, Manassei, et al., 2016; van Dyck
et al., 2016). The heartbeat-tracking task has recently come under
scrutiny over concerns that it may not always/necessarily provide
a valid measure of interoception (e.g., Khalsa et al., 2009; see also
Brener & Ring, 2016, for a review). While use of alternative,
complementary measures will be important in future studies to
develop a comprehensive view of the functional integrity of
interoception in disorders such as autism and alexithymia, the
predictions of the theories tested in the current study were never-
theless derived almost exclusively from studies of the heartbeat-
Figure 1. Mean interoceptive accuracy (IA) across all time intervals, among the autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) group (n  46), NT group (n  48), ASD group with low-alexithymia (n  19), and ASD group with
high alexithymia n (27), reported in Experiment 2. Individual data points have been indicated using black dots
and outliers (defined as IA scores 2 SD above/below the group mean) are indicated using red triangles. See
the online article for the color version of this figure.
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tracking task. Almost all existing studies of a) interoception in
ASD and b) the relation between interoception and alexithymia
have employed this task as an objective (rather than self-report)
index of IA (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Herbert et al., 2011; Schauder
et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2016, 2017; but, for exceptions, see Gaigg
et al., 2016; Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2018). Therefore, the
current findings are highly relevant in that they speak to, and
challenge, current thinking about what role interoceptive difficul-
ties might play in the etiology of autism and alexithymia.
In particular, the current findings challenge previous research
showing an association between alexithymia and IA. Across the
two experiments reported here, we failed to find a significant
association between heartbeat tracking accuracy and TAS score in
any of five analyses in four entirely independent subsamples, each
of which had more than sufficient statistical power to detect the
predicted association. In every case, Bayesian analyses indicated
that the data were in keeping with the null hypothesis. Also, in all
but one analysis, Fisher’s Z tests indicated that the associations
observed in the current study were significantly different (smaller/
less negative) than those reported previously. Given the well-
established “file-drawer” problem and evidence that some results
in psychology are difficult to replicate (e.g., Pashler & Wagen-
makers, 2012), we suggest the current results are important and
should contribute to theory building in this area. For instance, it is
interesting to note that a number of studies have recently reported
associations between alexithymia and interoception using self-
report measures of interoception (Betka et al., 2018; Brewer,
Cook, & Bird, 2016; Longarzo et al., 2015). As Garfinkel et al.,
(2015) have recently pointed out, self-report questionnaires and
objective measures of interoception such as the heartbeat-tracking
task, capture dissociable aspects of interoception. Specifically,
whereas self-report questionnaires provide insight into people’s
interoceptive sensibility (i.e., the extent to which they tend to be
aware of interoceptive signals), heartbeat-tracking tasks provide
insight into their IA (i.e., the extent to which they perceive intero-
ceptive signals accurately), and both dimensions can vary inde-
pendently. The findings reported in the current paper suggest that
IA is neither related to alexithymia nor impaired in ASD, but do
not speak to the role of other facets of interoception in the etiology
of either alexithymia or ASD.
Another implication of the current findings is that the results
appear problematic for the alexithymia hypothesis of autism,
which argues that some of the cognitive/emotional-processing
difficulties which are common in the condition, are due to alex-
ithymia and should not be characterized as central components of
the ASD phenotype (Bird & Cook, 2013). The current results test
several of the predictions arising from this theory. On the one
hand, in Experiment 1, we found that performance on the RMIE
task was associated significantly with performance on the TAS,
but not the AQ (and that the TAS  RMIE correlation remained
significant after controlling for AQ score). This replicates Oakley
et al.’s (2016) findings and suggests, in accordance with the
alexithymia hypothesis, that emotional aspects of mind reading are
related to level of alexithymia rather than number of ASD traits.
On the other hand, in Experiment 2, there were no significant
differences between ASD participants with and without clinically
significant levels of alexithymia in RMIE task performance. Thus,
difficulties with emotional aspects of mind reading are still appar-
ent in individuals with ASD who do not have alexithymia, contrary
to the alexithymia hypothesis. Regardless, the assessment of the
relation between alexithymia and mindreading was a secondary
aim of the current study. The primary aim was to assess a different
prediction stemming from the alexithymia hypothesis, namely, that
only individuals with ASD who manifest high levels of alexithy-
mia should display diminished interoception, whereas IA should
be unimpaired in those with ASD who manifest low levels of
self-reported alexithymia (Gaigg et al., 2016; Shah, Catmur, et al.,
2016). The current study provided a complete test of this hypoth-
esis for the first time. Previous studies aiming to test the alexithy-
mia hypothesis have matched ASD and comparison groups for
(subclinical) levels of alexithymia, found no between-groups dif-
ferences in IA, and then claimed that if the participant groups had
not been matched for level of alexithymia then between-groups
differences in IA would have been found. But to prove such a
claim, the IA of an ASD-high alexithymia group and a matched
ASD-low alexithymia group needed to be compared directly. The
fact that we observed no significant difference in IA between these
two ASD groups (in fact there was a slight, nonsignificant trend for
the ASD-high alexithymia group to show superior accuracy) pro-
vides a clear challenge to the alexithymia hypothesis of ASD, at
least with regard to predictions about IA in heartbeat detection.
Instead, the results are in keeping with theories of self-
awareness in ASD that draw a distinction between psychological
and physical aspects of self. In the literature on the typical devel-
opment of self-awareness, a distinction between physical and
psychological aspects of self is frequently drawn (Gillihan &
Farah, 2005). Several researchers have applied this framework to
ASD and suggested that people with this disorder tend to have a
diminished awareness of the psychological self (one’s own mental
states, personality traits, autobiographical memories etc.), leaving
awareness of the physical self (e.g., awareness of one’s physical
appearance, physiological states, motor routines etc.) relatively
undiminished (e.g., Lind, 2010; Uddin, 2011; Williams, 2010). It
is important to note that these theories do not predict that people
with ASD necessarily interpret their physiological states accu-
rately, but merely that they can detect them accurately. Interpreting
physiological states arguably requires the kind of metacognitive
monitoring ability that is known to be impaired in people with this
disorder (e.g., (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014; Williams, Berg-
ström, & Grainger, 2018; Williams, Lind, & Happé, 2009),
whereas mere detection should not (Carruthers, 2009). At the very
least, the finding of unimpaired IA among individuals with ASD in
the current study provides support for this prediction that basic
representation of bodily states is undiminished in ASD.
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